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Sterling financial markets
Overview
Following heightened concerns earlier in the year about the
sustainability of fiscal positions in a number of European
countries, sentiment in financial markets improved in June and
July, before deteriorating somewhat in August.  
In the United Kingdom, contacts noted that the formation of a
new government and the announcement of its plans for fiscal
consolidation had reduced a key source of uncertainty
affecting sterling asset markets.  Similarly, publication of the
results of stress tests for European banks together with revised
proposals for the introduction of new international prudential
bank regulations helped to ease strains within financial
markets.  Subsequent to the review period, the governing body
of the Basel Committee announced higher global minimum
capital standards for banks.
However, concerns about sovereign default risk in some
European countries persisted, with sovereign credit default
swap (CDS) premia for these countries remaining elevated.
Moreover, despite robust economic growth in the first half 
of the year, doubts about the durability and speed of the 
global economic recovery grew, in particular following 
weaker-than-expected US macroeconomic data.  This was
reflected in falls in medium-term government bond yields in
the major economies, with, for example, US and UK yields
approaching historic lows (Chart 1). 
Against that background, UK monetary policy remained highly
accommodative.  And market participants continued to push
back the timing of when they expected this accommodation to
start to be removed.
Recent developments in sterling capital markets
Monetary policy and short-term interest rates
In each of the monetary policy meetings during the review
period, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) voted to maintain Bank Rate at 0.5% and the stock of
asset purchases financed by central bank reserves at 
£200 billion.  As a result, UK monetary policy remained highly
accommodative, echoing the situation in most other industrial
economies.
In terms of market interest rates, sterling overnight rates
generally traded close to Bank Rate (Chart 2).  There was a
brief pickup in the secured overnight rate in July, which
contacts attributed to a temporary increase in demand for
short-dated secured borrowing around the time of the
maturity of the ECB’s first unlimited twelve-month refinancing
operation.
Looking ahead, market participants continued to expect UK
monetary policy to remain accommodative for some time.
Overnight index swap (OIS) rates fell, as market expectations
of Bank Rate at the end of 2011 and 2012 were revised down
(Chart 3).  In addition, a Reuters survey of economists showed
a small increase in the number of respondents expecting the
MPC to conduct further asset purchases.  These developments
in part reflected a reassessment of the global economic
This article reviews developments in sterling financial markets, including the Bank’s official
operations, since the 2010 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin up to 27 August 2010.
(1) The article also
summarises market intelligence on selected topical issues relating to market functioning.  
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(1) The data cut-off for the previous Bulletin was 21 May 2010.















Source:  Global Financial Data.
(a) Ten-year US government bond yields.
(b) Compiled from yields on 2.5% UK Consolidated Stock (Consols) up to 1958 Q1 and yields on
ten-year UK government bonds from 1958 Q2 onwards.  As Consols are undated stock, the
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outlook.  Consistent with that, there were similar falls in 
US dollar OIS rates, though euro OIS rates changed by less.
Bank funding markets
In line with OIS rates, short-term interbank borrowing rates
fell, having risen slightly in May around the time of heightened
concerns over sovereign default risk in some European
countries.  As a result, sterling Libor-OIS spreads — an
indicator of near-term bank funding conditions — remained
broadly stable (Chart 4).  Similarly, the results from the Bank’s
new indexed long-term repo (ILTR) operations suggested little
material change in banks’ demand for sterling liquidity from
the Bank.  These operations and others within the sterling
monetary framework are described in the box on page 160.
However, not all banks can access interbank funding markets
on the same terms.  In particular, the average deviation of
banks’ euro funding rates, as indicated by their Libor
submissions, increased a little.  Contacts thought that banks
that were perceived to rely more heavily on ECB facilities had
to pay higher market interest rates to obtain funding.
Such variations in the cost of interbank borrowing were also
evident in cross-currency funding markets.  According to
contacts, smaller European banks with less direct access than
other banks to US dollar funding markets found it more
expensive to borrow in sterling and euros and swap the
proceeds into US dollars.  Reflecting this, the implied cost of
US dollar funding via foreign exchange markets increased in
July and August, although it ended the review period broadly
unchanged (Chart 5).
At longer horizons, five-year UK bank CDS premia — moves in
which would typically be associated with changes in bank
funding costs — fell during June and July but rose in August,
mirroring international moves (Chart 6).  Overall they were
around 20 basis points lower than at the time of the previous
Bulletin.  And in line with US and European banking sectors,
major UK banks’ equity prices rose on average by around 5%,
although there was considerable variation across institutions.  
Overall, sentiment towards banks improved somewhat.  This
appeared largely to reflect three main factors.  First, the
publication of bank stress-test results by the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors reduced uncertainty by
providing greater disclosure about European banks’ exposures
to sovereign debt.  Second, banks’ earnings results for the






















Sources:  BrokerTec, Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s overnight index swap (OIS) curves.
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Three-month Libor-OIS spreads derived from Libor fixings.
(b) Average absolute deviation of individual panel members’ three-month Libor submissions
from the Libor fixing.
Chart 4 Three-month Libor-OIS spreads and average
deviations from Libor fixings160 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
Operations within the sterling monetary
framework
Over the review period, the level of reserves continued to be
determined by two main factors:  the stock of reserves injected
via asset purchases and the level of reserves supplied by 
long-term repo open market operations (OMOs).  The box on
pages 164–65 provides more detail on the Asset Purchase
Facility.  This box describes the Bank’s operations within the
sterling monetary framework over the review period.  
Indexed long-term repo (ILTR) OMOs
The Bank recently reformed the design of its long-term repo
(LTR) operations to enable funds to be lent against different
types of collateral depending on the degree of stress in 
the system.  The new ILTRs replaced the three-month 
extended-collateral long-term repos and the three, six, nine
and twelve-month long-term repos previously offered by the
Bank against standard collateral.(1)
The Bank offered £5 billion via three-month ILTRs on both 
15 June and 13 July followed by a £2.5 billion six-month
operation on 17 August.  All three auctions were well covered,
suggesting counterparties were comfortable with the new
operations.  Table 1 shows the results of these operations.
Based on the pattern of bids received, the Bank allotted around
17% of the auction to bids against wider collateral in the 
three-month ILTR auctions held in June and July, producing a
clearing spread on wider collateral of 26 basis points over 
Bank Rate in both auctions.  In each case, the remaining 83%
of the auction was allocated to bids against narrow collateral
at or very close to Bank Rate, producing a stop-out spread (the
difference between clearing spreads) of around 25 basis points. 
In contrast, the six-month operation held in August produced
clearing spreads of 1 basis point and 50 basis points on narrow
and wider collateral respectively, resulting in a stop-out spread
of 49 basis points.  Consequently, a higher proportion of funds
(24%) was allocated against wider collateral.
Reserves provided via ILTRs were more than offset by the
maturity of three-month extended-collateral long-term repo
operations and six, nine and twelve-month long-term repos.
Consequently, the stock of LTRs outstanding declined.
Operational Standing Facilities
As a result of the suspension of reserves targets and the
change to remunerate all reserves at Bank Rate announced on
5 March 2009, the rate paid on the Operational Standing
Deposit Facility was reduced to zero.  Reflecting this, average
use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each of the
maintenance periods under review.  Average use of the lending
facility was also £0 million over the period.
Discount Window Facility
The Discount Window Facility (DWF) is a permanent facility 
to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system.  On 
6 July 2010, the Bank announced that the average daily
amount outstanding in the DWF with an initial maturity of 
30 days or less between 1 January and 31 March 2010 was 
£0 million.  The average daily amount outstanding in the




At the end of January 2009, £185 billion of UK Treasury bills
had been lent under the Special Liquidity Scheme.  As noted in
the previous Bulletin, as at 28 February 2010, bills with a face
value of £165 billion remained outstanding.  Since that date,
banks have continued to make repayments.
US dollar repo operations
In response to renewed strains in the short-term funding
market for US dollars, from 11 May the Bank, in concert with
other central banks, reintroduced weekly fixed-rate tenders
with a seven-day maturity to offer US dollar liquidity.  As of 
27 August 2010, there has been no use of the facility.
Table 1 Indexed long-term repo operations
Total Collateral set summary
Narrow Wider
15 June 2010 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 7,685 5,300  2,385
Amount allotted (£ millions) 5,000  4,118  882
Cover 1.54 1.06 0.48
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 02 6
Stop-out spread(c) 26
13 July 2010 (three-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 5,000
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 6,400 4,850 1,560
Amount allotted (£ millions) 5,000 4,138  862
Cover 1.28 0.97 0.31
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 12 6
Stop-out spread(c) 25
17 August 2010 (six-month maturity)
On offer (£ millions) 2,500
Total bids received (£ millions)(a) 4,657 3,687 980
Amount allotted (£ millions) 2,500 1,895 605
Cover 1.86 1.47 0.39
Clearing spread above Bank Rate(b) 15 0
Stop-out spread(c) 49
(a) Due to the treatment of paired bids, the sum of bids received by collateral set may not equal total bids
received.
(b) Amounts shown in basis points.
(c) Difference between clearing spreads for wider and narrow collateral in basis points.
(1) For further details see ‘The Bank’s new indexed long-term repo operations’, in the
2010 Q2 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, pages 90–91. Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 161
second quarter, although generally lower than in the first
quarter, were higher than analysts’ expectations.  Third, revised
proposals for the new international prudential bank
regulations — the so-called Basel III rules — were perceived as
less stringent and, more importantly, according to contacts,
potentially allowed for a longer implementation period.
Together, these factors arguably removed some of the 
near-term pressure on banks to raise capital levels
significantly, which in the short term at least would be
expected to support bank profitability.
As part of the new Basel III rules, banks will need to lengthen
the term of their funding should they not wish to hold
additional liquid assets on their balance sheets.  However,
contacts noted that new regulations for money market funds
(MMFs) — a key provider of short-term financing for banks —
may ultimately encourage those institutions to shorten the
maturity of their assets.(1) Partly in response to these
international regulatory initiatives and following changes to
bank liquidity rules in the United Kingdom, UK banks used
innovative types of short-term funding instruments.  Examples
of these products are discussed in more detail in the box on
pages 168–69.  
UK banks also continued to issue longer-term debt in both
senior unsecured (Chart 7) and covered bond markets.  And
there were signs of activity in UK asset-backed securities
markets including some public issuance of collateralised loan
obligations.(2) But the longer-term funding challenge for 
banks remained — at the end of June, an estimated 
£750 billion–£800 billion of term funding for major UK banks
was due to mature by the end of 2012.(3)
Long-term interest rates
Contacts suggested that investors continued to seek safety in
the most liquid government bond markets, away from those
where sovereign risks were perceived to be greatest.  Reflecting
this, some European countries’ sovereign CDS premia
increased and yields on their government debt rose relative to
those on German government bonds (bunds).  Greek and Irish
government bond yields rose sharply, with the latter affected
by the downgrade of Ireland’s sovereign credit rating by
Standard and Poor’s in August. 
In contrast, the spread between gilt and bund yields narrowed
over the review period (Chart 8).  Market participants noted




















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year, senior credit default swaps (CDS) prices.
(b) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Co. and 
Morgan Stanley.
(c) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(d) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,














(a) Issuance with a value greater than or equal to US$500 million equivalent and original
maturity greater than one year.
(b) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
Chart 7 UK bank senior debt issuance(a)
(1) The SEC 2a-7 rule now limits the weighted average maturity of US MMFs to 60 days
(from 90 days previously).  New guidelines announced by the Committee of European
Securities Regulators in May are expected to place similar restrictions on European
MMFs.
(2) An asset-backed security backed by the receivables on loans.  Banks package and sell
their receivables on loans to investors in tranches of varying currency and risk.




















Sources:  British Bankers’ Association, Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of three-month US dollar Libor implied from foreign exchange forwards over actual
three-month US dollar Libor.  For more details on the construction of these measures see
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 2, page 134, Chart 26 and BIS Quarterly
Review, March 2008, pages 73–86.
Chart 5 Spread of foreign exchange implied cost of
three-month US dollar funding over US dollar Libor(a)162 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
that the new UK Government’s fiscal consolidation plans had
reduced uncertainty.
Over the review period as a whole, the gilt yield curve shifted
lower, mirroring changes in other major government bond
markets (Chart 9).  Indeed, medium-term yields on US and UK
government bonds fell towards historical lows (Chart 1). 
Part of the fall in yields reflected lower real forward rates as
concerns rose about the durability and speed of the global
economic recovery.  Against that backdrop, the 
US Federal Reserve announced that it would reinvest the
principal payments from its US Agency debt and agency
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread over ten-year German government bond yield.
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
(b) Derived from government bonds issued by Germany and France.
Chart 9 International nominal government bond yield
curves(a)
Changes to the inflation indexation of 
UK defined benefit pension fund liabilities
On 8 July 2010, the UK Government announced that it would
change the price index used to calculate the minimum rate
(required by the 1993 Pension Schemes Act) at which private
defined benefit pension fund liabilities accrue.  Previously, the
minimum reference rate had been calculated using the 
UK retail prices index (RPI).  However, for revaluations in
2011 (based on inflation in the year to September 2010), and
future years, it will be calculated using the UK consumer
prices index (CPI).
Though in principle the change applies to both deferred
pensions and pensions in payment, the total amount of
liabilities which will be affected remains uncertain.  In
particular, it will depend on individual scheme rules, the
decisions of employers and pension scheme trustees and the
extent of any other legislative changes.  For example, some
pension funds’ rules explicitly specify a minimum uplift linked
to RPI, rather than referring to the statutory minimum rate.
In this case, a pension fund would retain the link to RPI but in
order to comply with the statutory minimum it may need to
accrue its liabilities at the higher of CPI and RPI each year.
This change in indexation rules may have implications for
how pension funds manage their exposure to future inflation
when trying to ensure that they have sufficient assets to
meet future pension payouts.  RPI-linked financial assets,
which are currently typically used by pension funds as a
hedge against RPI-linked liabilities, may be less suitable as a
hedge for CPI-linked liabilities if the two price indices evolve
differently.(1)
Contacts suggested that funds seeking to hedge their future
pension liabilities would ideally like to invest in assets whose
pay-offs are closely linked to the relevant price index used for
their annual revaluation.  At present there is no active market
for CPI-linked financial instruments in the United Kingdom
and market contacts generally expected that pension funds
would continue to hedge their CPI-linked liabilities with 
RPI-linked instruments.  Likewise, contacts noted that there
had not been any significant changes in pension fund hedging
behaviour in response to the July announcement, although
there was some volatility in index-linked gilt yields around
that time.  
(1) For more discussion on the differences between CPI and RPI measures see the box
‘The wedge between RPI and CPI inflation’ on pages 29–30 in the Bank of England
Inflation Report, November 2005.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 163
US government bonds with the aim to support the US
economic recovery. 
In the United Kingdom, real forward interest rates rose in July
(Chart 10).  This might in part have reflected an initial reaction
by investors to the proposed legislative changes to UK pension
fund indexation rules (see the box opposite for more details).
But contacts thought that the main factor behind this 
increase in real forward rates was the issuance of the 
2040 index-linked gilt, which boosted the available supply of
UK index-linked debt.  These effects proved temporary and
medium-term sterling real interest rates fell in August in line
with international markets. 
Perhaps consistent with investor perceptions of a protracted
period of subdued real and nominal global demand, 
medium-term forward inflation rates declined somewhat over
the review period (Chart 11). 
At the same time, information derived from UK inflation
options indicated that investors placed less weight on the
possibility of high inflation over the medium term, despite
recent above-target outturns and the prospective uplift from
the VAT changes announced in the June Budget, and placed
slightly more weight on below-zero outturns (Chart 12).
Foreign exchange
Developments in relative interest rates might have accounted
for some of the 5.6% appreciation of the sterling effective
exchange rate index (ERI) over the period (Chart 13).  In
particular, at times during the period, worries about the US
economic outlook pushed down on US dollar interest rates
relative to sterling interest rates.  However, in general, sterling















Source:  Bank calculations. 
(a) Sterling and US dollar real interest rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
Euro rates derived using the Bank’s inflation swap and government liability curves.
(b) Sterling real interest rates are derived from instruments that reference RPI inflation, while 
US dollar and euro real rates are derived from instruments referencing CPI inflation.  This
partly explains why the level of medium-term sterling real rates has been consistently below 
similar-maturity US dollar and euro real rates.



















Source:  Bank calculations. 
(a) Sterling and US dollar forward inflation rates derived from the Bank’s government liability
curves.  Euro forward inflation rates derived using the Bank’s inflation swap curve.
Chart 11 International five-year implied inflation rates,
five years forward(a)
Chart 12 Weight on high and low UK RPI inflation












Sources:  Bloomberg, Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank calculations.
(a) Probability that RPI inflation will be below zero or greater than 5% based on the average
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Chart 13 International exchange rate indices164 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
Asset purchases(1)
The Bank did not undertake any gilt purchases under the 
Asset Purchase Facility (APF) over the review period.  As a
result, the stock of gilts held by the APF (in terms of the
amount paid to sellers) was maintained at £198.3 billion.(2)
The Bank continued to offer to lend some of its gilt holdings
via the Debt Management Office (DMO) in return for other 
UK government collateral.  
Purchases of high-quality private sector assets financed by the
issuance of Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management
operations continued, in line with the arrangements
announced on 29 January 2009. 
Table 1 summarises operations under the APF over the review
period by type of asset.
Gilt lending facility
In the three months to 30 June 2010, a daily average of 
£2.12 billion of gilts were lent as part of the gilt lending facility.
Use of the facility continued to be concentrated in gilts in
which the Bank held a large proportion of the free float (the
total amount of a gilt in issue less the amount held by the 
UK Government).
Corporate bonds
In order to improve the functioning of the sterling corporate
bond market, the Bank continued to offer to purchase and sell
corporate bonds via the Corporate Bond Secondary Market
Scheme.
During the review period, activity in the Bank’s auctions
continued to reflect broader market conditions.  In particular,
the Bank received increased offers in its purchase auctions in
May and June, with £507 million offered on 8 June, the largest
amount of offers in a single auction (Chart A).  Despite the
deterioration in investor sentiment during this period, the Bank
also saw an increase in the number of bids received in some
sale auctions. 
Activity in the Bank’s purchase auctions fell in July and August.
Spreads also narrowed and there was continued activity in the
Bank’s sale auctions.
As of 26 August 2010, the Bank portfolio totalled 
£1,571 million, compared to £1,419 million at the end of the
previous review period. 
Commercial paper
The Bank continued to offer to purchase sterling-denominated
investment-grade commercial paper (CP) issued by companies
that make a material contribution to UK economic activity.
Spreads on sterling-denominated CP widened marginally in
May and June, reflecting broader market conditions.  But they
stabilised and subsequently narrowed towards the end of the
review period.  And the majority of spreads on primary
Table 1 APF transactions by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial paper Gilts Corporate bond Total(b)
Purchases Sales
20 May 2010(c)(d) 251 198,275 1,419 199,945
Thursday 27 May 2010 200 0 91 1 290
Thursday 3 June 2010 0 0 25 14 11
Thursday 10 June 2010 0 0 107 11 96
Thursday 17 June 2010 50 0 6 3 53
Thursday 24 June 2010 0 0 4 11 -7
Thursday 1 July 2010 0 0 4 0 4
Thursday 8 July 2010 0 0 2 0 2
Thursday 15 July 2010 0 0 5 2 3
Thursday 22 July 2010 140 0 9 0 149
Thursday 29 July 2010 0 0 0 8 -8
Thursday 5 August 2010 0 0 0 19 -19
Thursday 12 August 2010 0 0 2 8 -6
Thursday 19 August 2010 120 0 0 9 111
Thursday 26 August 2010 0 0 5 4 1
Total financed by a deposit from the DMO(d)(e) 120 – 340 460
Total financed by central bank reserves(d)(e) 0 198,275 1,231 199,506
Total asset purchases(d)(e) 120 198,275 1,571 199,966
(a) Week-ended amounts are for purchases in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, and for sales in terms of the value at which the Bank initially purchased the securities.  All amounts are on a trade-day basis, rounded to the
nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) Measured as amount outstanding as at 20 May 2010.
(d) Proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
(e) Data may not sum due to assets maturing over the period.Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 165
issuance remained below the levels at which the APF offered to
purchase CP.  Accordingly, the APF made few purchases during
the review period.  The stock of APF purchases fell from 
£251 million on 20 May to close to zero during much of the
review period.  Following purchases during August, the
outstanding stock stood at £120 million as of 26 August 2010.
Over the same period, the stock of CP issued by UK corporate
and non-bank firms stabilised at around £2.5 billion (Chart B). 
Secured commercial paper facility
The Bank continued to offer to purchase secured commercial
paper (SCP) backed by underlying assets that are short term
and provide credit to companies or consumers that support
economic activity in the United Kingdom.(3) There has been no
use of the facility to date.
Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) from the secondary
market, but stands ready to do so should conditions in that
market deteriorate.  The UK Government’s 2008 CGS closed
for new issuance on 28 February 2010, although institutions
are able to refinance existing debt guaranteed by the Scheme.
(1) The data cut-off for this box is 26 August 2010, unless otherwise stated.
(2) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
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(a) Data start on 26 March 2010.
(b) Weekly (Friday-Thursday) amounts in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a
trade-day basis.
(c) Weekly (Friday-Thursday) amounts in terms of value at time of initial purchase, on a 
trade-day basis.




















Sources:  CP Ware and Bank calculations.
Chart B Sterling commercial paper outstanding for
UK corporates and non-bank financial firms166 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
by interest rate differentials (Chart 14).  This implies that other
factors were also important.  For example, contacts suggested
that perceptions about the relative risk of investing in 
sterling-denominated assets improved, perhaps because of
reduced uncertainty about the UK fiscal outlook.  This could
have underpinned the increase in the value of sterling.  
Perhaps consistent with a decline in perceived risks, 
options-based measures of forward-looking uncertainty in
sterling exchange rates fell and the implied probability
distribution around future values of sterling became less
negatively skewed (Chart 15).  This might indicate that market
participants were less willing to pay to protect themselves
from a large future depreciation of sterling.  However, similar
measures of uncertainty for other currencies also fell,
suggesting this development was not unique to sterling.
Corporate capital markets
Spreads on investment-grade bonds issued by non-financial
companies were little changed for much of the period 
(Chart 16).  Taken together with the fall in government bond
yields, the cost of corporate bond financing declined slightly.
An indicative measure of the cost of equity finance was
broadly unchanged (Chart 17).
Market contacts reported that turnover and liquidity in the
sterling corporate bond market had been reduced at times.
But they also noted that the corporate bond scheme of the
Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility (APF) continued to provide a
helpful backstop for both purchases and sales of sterling
corporate bonds.  In particular, the APF received increased
offers in its purchase auctions at the beginning of June.  The
box on pages 164–65 provides more information about the
activities of the APF over the review period.
Despite the difficult market conditions early in the review
period, gross bond issuance by private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs) in the calendar year up to July was
broadly in line with average issuance over 2005–08.  Gross
issuance of equity capital picked up towards the end of the
review period, although cumulative issuance in the first seven
months of 2010 was below the comparable average over
2005–08 (Table A).
Overall, while equity issuance net of share buybacks was
positive, repayments of maturing debt tended to exceed 
new bond issuance (Chart 18).  Combined with a continued
net reduction in loan financing, this indicates that in 
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Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) For more information on the analytics required to isolate the impact of interest rate ‘news’
on exchange rates, see Brigden, A, Martin, B and Salmon, C (1997), ‘Decomposing exchange
rate movements according to the uncovered interest rate parity condition’, Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, November, pages 377–89.
Chart 14 Implied contribution of interest rate ‘news’ to
cumulative changes in sterling bilateral exchange rates
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Sources:  ICAP and Bank calculations.
(a) Returns are defined as the logarithmic difference between the current forward rate and the
spot rate at the maturity date of the contract.
(b) The simplified sterling ERI places 70% weight on the euro-sterling bilateral exchange rate and
30% weight on the US dollar-sterling bilateral exchange rate.
(c) For more detail on using options prices to derive a probability distribution for the sterling ERI,
see the box in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Summer 2006, pages 130–31.
Chart 15 Three-month option-implied volatility and















Sources:  Bank of America/Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations.
(a) Option-adjusted spreads.
Chart 16 International investment-grade, non-financial,
corporate bond spreads(a)Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 167
Market intelligence on developments in
market structure
In discharging its responsibilities to maintain monetary and
financial stability, the Bank gathers information from contacts
across a wide spectrum of financial markets.  This market
intelligence helps inform the Bank’s assessment of monetary
conditions and possible sources of financial instability and is
routinely synthesised with research and analysis in the
Inflation Report and the Financial Stability Report.  More
generally, regular dialogue with market contacts provides
valuable insights about how markets function, which provides
context for policy formulation, including the design and
evaluation of the Bank’s own market operations.  And the Bank
conducts occasional market surveys to gather additional
quantitative information on certain markets.
The boxes on pages 168–69 and page 170 summarise recent
market intelligence on two selected topics:  innovations in
money market instruments and ratings-based termination
triggers in derivatives contracts.
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Sources:  Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The cost of equity is measured as a risk-free rate plus an equity risk premium.  The risk-free
rate is approximated by a ten-year nominal gilt yield.  The equity risk premium is inferred
from a dividend discount model applied to the FTSE All-Share index, which includes financial
institutions.  For further details of the latter, see Inkinen, M, Stringa, M and Voutsinou, K
(2010), ‘Interpreting equity price movements since the start of the financial crisis’, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 1, pages 24–33.
(b) The cost of bond finance is measured as the average yield-to-maturity on the Bank of
America/Merrill Lynch Sterling Corporate Industrials and Utilities indices.
Chart 17 Indicative cost of sterling corporate bond and
equity finance
Table A Cumulative bond and equity issuance by UK PNFCs
£ billions
Bonds(a) Equity
Full year January to  Full year January to 
July(b) July(b)
2005 12.8 4.9 20.2 10.5
2006 24.1 15.1 34.2 19.3
2007 24.2 11.5 27.3 18.1
2008 35.4 21.2 57.4 35.2
2009 44.7 34.2 78.5 55.6
2010 15.0 15.6
2005–08 average 24.1 13.2 34.8 20.8
Sources:  Dealogic, London Stock Exchange and Bank calculations.
(a) Converted from US dollar to sterling using monthly averages of the US dollar per sterling exchange rate.
(b) Cumulative issuance from the beginning of January to the end of July in each calendar year.168 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
Innovations in money market instruments
Ongoing funding pressures in short-term money markets have
led to the use of innovative funding instruments by banks that
help them diversify across providers of funds and increase the
maturity of their wholesale funding.  These instruments
include so-called putable certificates of deposit (CDs) and
extendible repos.(1) Such instruments typically differ in the
maturity of the funding they provide, the degree of optionality
embedded in them, and methods of pricing.  This box describes
these instruments in more detail.
Putable CDs
CDs are unsecured short-term debt issued by banks.  As such,
they provide banks with unsecured funding, generally for a
period of between one month and 18 months.  Putable CDs are
very similar to ordinary CDs but contain a put option that gives
the investor the right (but not the obligation) to sell the CD
back to the issuing bank at a pre-defined date prior to its
original maturity date.  By exercising this option, investors can
thus obtain early return of the funds they provided.  
A typical structure involves a twelve-month CD with a put
option that can be exercised daily but with a 95-day notice (or
‘lock-in’) period.  Chart A plots the effective outstanding
maturity — the minimum remaining period for which the funds
will be available to the bank — of such a putable CD against
the elapsed time since issuance.  The red area shows how the
effective outstanding maturity changes over time for the case
when the put option has been exercised after 40 days.  In that
case, the putable CD matures after a total of 135 days.  The
blue area shows the effective outstanding maturity for the
same CD should the option not be exercised.  In that case, 
the effective outstanding maturity will start to decline after
265 days and the CD will mature after 360 days.   
Extendible repos
Repo transactions provide funding to banks via a secured
investment — the bank sells a security in exchange for cash
and agrees to buy it back at a particular date.  Extendible repos
are similar, except that the date of repayment can be
continually extended.  
A typical transaction might involve an initial 30-day repo
transaction that specifies a pre-defined date (usually fifteen
days before maturity) when the transaction can be extended
to its original 30-day maturity or, alternatively, be left to 
run-off.  Any extension requires the consent of both parties to
the transaction. 
Chart B shows the maturity profile of such a 30-day
extendible repo.  The red area shows the effective maturity
outstanding in the event that the repo is extended after fifteen
and 30 days but not after 45 days.  At that time, rather than
reverting to the original effective outstanding maturity of 
30 days, the transaction matures fifteen days later after a total
of 60 days.  In theory, the repo can be extended indefinitely as
illustrated by the blue area. 
Market characteristics
These instruments are an alternative source of term funding
for banks to traditional money market instruments.  Although
UK banks have shown notable interest in these instruments,
the value of most transactions appears so far to have been
modest relative to banks’ overall funding bases.  
Some of the attraction of these instruments is likely to reflect
recent regulatory developments.  In particular, the notice
periods have partly been structured to help banks meet new
regulatory liquidity requirements that aim to lengthen banks’
funding profiles.  In the United Kingdom, one part of the
Financial Services Authority’s liquidity rules is structured
around a stress test that makes wholesale funding of less than
three months’ maturity less attractive to banks.  So, for
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with an effective maturity of more than three months and,
hence, do not fall within the regulatory stress test.
From the perspective of investors (ie lenders to banks), these
instruments offer higher returns than shorter-maturity
instruments while allowing them to redeem their investments
early.  The short-dated nature of these putable CDs makes
them especially attractive to money market funds (MMFs),
particularly in the United States, whereas the secured nature of
an extendible repo makes it an attractive investment for
securities lenders and banks.  Table 1 summarises the main
market characteristics including the typical investors involved
and the geographical coverage.
As with banks, the new instruments may help investors meet
new regulatory rules.  For example, in the United States,
following changes to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rules, the maximum weighted average maturity of US
MMFs’ investments was reduced from 90 days to 60 days.
Putable CDs with a 95-day notice period potentially offer
returns comparable to those from longer-dated ordinary CDs,
so they appeal to MMFs regulated by the SEC.  
(1) Extendible repos were popular among US regional banks before the onset of the
financial crisis and have recently been used by UK banks, though backed by more
traditional collateral.  
Table 1 Market characteristics
Putable CD Extendible repo
Currency Mainly US$  Mainly US$
Investors MMFs and asset managers Securities lenders, banks 
and asset managers
Size Small but growing Large
Region United States and Europe Global170 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q3
Additional Termination Event clauses
Additional Termination Event (ATE) clauses are embedded in
many derivatives and a wide range of other financial products
that include derivatives (eg asset-backed securities).  This box
focuses in particular on those ATE clauses that apply to
derivative transactions between UK pension funds and those
banks that are the main derivative dealers.
Defined benefit pension funds’ use of derivatives
A defined benefit (DB) pension scheme typically guarantees
members an income on retirement irrespective of the
performance of the fund’s assets.  This means that a DB
scheme bears the risk that the return on the investments may
not be sufficient to meet its liabilities.
Given the structure of their liabilities (in particular the
requirement to index them to inflation), UK DB pension fund
schemes face risks arising from unexpected changes in nominal
interest rates, life expectancy, inflation and scheme members’
wage growth.  To mitigate such risks some DB pension
schemes engage in so-called Liability Driven Investment (LDI)
strategies.  LDI strategies aim to invest in a portfolio that
closely matches the risks of the fund’s DB liabilities.  In
particular, pension funds can choose to hedge their exposure
to interest rate and inflation risk by entering into derivative
transactions such as long-dated interest rate swaps and 
long-dated inflation-linked swaps.
What are ATEs?
Whenever two counterparties enter into a derivative trade
(such as a swap) many of the terms and conditions of the trade
are pre-defined in a legal agreement:  the ISDA master
agreement (often called ‘the ISDA’).(1)
Many ISDAs define a standard range of events that trigger an
option to allow one counterparty to terminate the trade early.
For example, a derivatives trade could be terminated if a
counterparty loses regulatory approval or defaults on an
obligation.  In addition, many ISDAs can include so-called 
ATE clauses which stipulate additional criteria that may permit
early termination of the trade. 
ATE clauses that apply to derivative trades between dealers
and pension funds typically allow the pension fund to
terminate the trade with the original dealer in the event that
the dealer is downgraded below a certain credit rating
threshold.  The most common credit rating threshold is A-. 
Such ATE clauses may also allow the pension fund to replace
the derivative trade with an alternative dealer and charge the
costs of replacing the trade to the original dealer.  The details
of the replacement costs vary according to the specifics of the
ISDA.  But if the market in which the derivative trade is being
re-established has become more volatile, the costs of replacing
the trade will typically be greater than the cost incurred during
periods of normal volatility. 
Why are they important?
Unexpected credit downgrades of financial institutions have in
the past been associated with significant volatility in asset
prices.  Over recent years, the credit ratings of the major
dealers have been moved closer to the A- threshold.  As a
result, the presence of ATE clauses could potentially amplify
asset price moves should dealers’ ratings be lowered below A-.
Contacts indicated that this could be especially disruptive if
there were simultaneous downgrades of a number of dealers.
This is because the volume of derivatives trades that pension
funds might potentially seek to replace would be large relative
to the typical daily turnover in those markets. 
Moreover, against a backdrop of heightened market volatility,
the replacement costs due under an ATE are most likely to rise.
The increased replacement costs charged to the original
dealers could therefore add to liquidity and capital pressures
on those dealers. 
In light of this, contacts report that some dealers have sought
to renegotiate the credit rating trigger levels to a lower
threshold.  Alternatively, in some instances, ATE clauses have
been modified to allow dealers to place additional collateral
with a pension fund instead of paying the replacement cost of
the derivative.  This reduces the credit exposure of the pension
fund to the dealer.  However, such collateral triggers may have
drawbacks as they require dealers to fund additional collateral
at times when their access to funding may be under greater
stress.
(1) ISDA stands for International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 